Introduction
Yusri Hazran, writing in the May Jerusalem Strategic Tribune , has raised important questions about the future of Syria, for many reasons critical to the security of the rest of the region as well as to the US and Europe. However, his suggestion of a federated Syria may not be feasible, although elements of such a structure are possible if the international community can unite on specific steps.
Dr. Hazran is on target stressing the magnitude of the Syrian tragedy from 2011-2024, ”the bloodiest conflict the Middle East has known in the twentieth century.” And he is correct in asserting that this tragic history offers a compelling argument for Syrians, and the region, to get things right now that the civil war has ended with a victory by opposition forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader al-Shara’a. But the Syrian tragedy did not just affect, terribly, the Syrian people. The conflict threatened to pull the entire region into war by drawing in Russia, Iran and its proxies, notably Lebanese Hizbullah, and by fueling terrorist groups from the Islamic State and HTS (before it “transformed” into a pure opposition force) to the PKK offshoot the YPG (renamed the Syrian Democratic Forces), pushing twelve million people from their homes, and even generating a regional drug crisis with massive captagon drug exports.
Fortuitously, the end of the civil war has opened opportunities for equally dramatic regional change in the opposite direction, towards stability and peace, with Iran and its proxies permanently driven out, and with the Islamic State facing final defeat. It is thus critical that Syria, and the region, forestall either a return to disorder and chaos, or the return of Iran and Russia to make new mischief.
Could a Federation Work?
While Dr. Hazran is right about the need to both protect, and provide rights to, Syrian minorities, his recipe, a federal state, may not be feasible. It would necessarily favor separate internal armies, staked-out territory, local majority rule, and a permanent temptation for more autonomy or even independence, possibly supported by foreign powers. A better approach would be agreements to balance central authority with a certain degree of local governance between the government and the various groups (many still armed), reinforced eventually with constitutional provisions.
But before sketching possible such local governance models, it may be helpful to outline the problems with federalism, starting with regional history and culture, moving to historical analogies, and then to international reactions.
It is correct, but unfair, to argue that the Middle East is inhospitable terrain for federal states. Correct, as no federal states of significance have arisen since the breakup of empires eighty to one-hundred years ago, with two exceptions, the UAE and Iraq since 2005. Furthermore, the special problems of Arab states—most of them initially artificial creations from a larger Arab identity—strengthen the bias against further burdening these already challenged national identities. But also unfair, as there is little precedent beyond the Middle East for federal states. The few of significance, including Germany (both imperial and post-World War II), the US, Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent the UK and Belgium, were the products of unions of pre-existing sovereign states or other geopolitical entities. Under stress, the former three collapsed or nearly collapsed: the German empire after World War I, Yugoslavia after the fall of communism, and the US over slavery.
The decade of turbulence in Yugoslavia, spreading throughout the Balkans following its collapse in 1991, illustrates well the dangers of federalism if not fully accepted by populations, by neighbors, and by great powers.
The Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is a Middle Eastern exception. It emerged from unique circumstances: an oppressed minority in a discrete (and largely defensible) region; supported by two powerful outside states, the US and (eventually) Türkiye, with goals to balance other forces, be it Saddam’s Baghdad or indirectly Teheran. But Ankara and Washington’s support was limited; neither backed independence for the KRG, given the possibility of internal and regional conflict, the desire of both states to maintain reasonable relations with hydrocarbon rich Iraq as a whole, and in the case of Ankara fear of impact on its own Kurdish population. Nevertheless, survival of the KRG’s very liberal federal characteristics, including its own military forces, internal administration and governance, rests on both the Iraqi constitution and the forbearance of those outside states.
One practical problem with a federal system for Syria is the attitude of the international community. The Arab world, Türkiye, Europe, the UN, and important humanitarian and development assistance NGOs all support a unified Syria at this point, and recently have been joined by the Trump administration. One lesson of the Syrian civil war is that any Syria policy, even if it be mediocre or deeply flawed, if supported by most of the international community is better than two or three wiser policies that split the international players. An added problem with any federal initiative is that it would require a powerful, self-confident outside power, with a taste for internal tweaking, to convince the current Syrian state, various minorities, and the international community to enlist in such an effort. The US for better or for worse long played that role in the region, but President Trump has dramatically buried that instinct in his Riyadh remarks, and all indications are he meant it.
Federalism “Light”
A possibly more feasible alternative to a federal system could be practical and constitutional steps to allow a certain degree of local government and in particular core rights by religious and ethnic minorities. Moreover, such an approach if agreed upon by the international community could be tightly linked to development assistance, needed investment, and diplomatic reintegration. It would follow the generally successful diplomatic model: a unified international position using significant skin in the game for limited, feasible demands, with in this case three specific approaches: constitutional and national provisions; local government; and international ties.
The Syrian interim constitution provides for freedom of belief but also tilts towards Sharia law. The eventual permanent constitution needs stronger language on religious freedom and the use of their language by the Kurdish population in education and administration in areas where they are in the majority. More important will be the practical steps taken now by the regime vis-à-vis ethnic and religious minorities. While the outbreak of fighting in recent months with Alawites and Druze is regrettable, the government’s response so far has been commendable, seeking compromise and de-escalation.
To the extent feasible at present under the interim constitution, Damascus could allow self-administration for the various provinces. This could involve establishing their own local police, selecting municipal and provincial leadership, and a certain degree of executive, legislative and judicial control over issues better managed locally than nation-wide. It would be important to eventually anchor such arrangements in the permanent constitution. Above all, such provincial self-administration should be adopted uniformly country-wide on the basis of geographical units, not piecemeal based on specific ethnic and religious groups, who would likely then soon see those provinces as “their” territory.
Finally, Türkiye, the US, and Israel have to end, or at least modify, their sponsorship of specific groups and especially their military forces. One possibility is to add Syria formally to the global Defeat-ISIS Coalition, similar to Iraq’s status, with Turkish and US counter-terrorism forces officially present through agreement with Damascus. Israeli troops and their relationship with the Druze would have to be handled differently, as this is a longer-term issue related to the 1974 Syria-Israel agreements, the Golan Heights, and other issues. But as the Druze are but a small minority, and the geographic spread of the Israeli military is quite limited, such a special “handle later” status should be feasible.
