In the years preceding the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, two alternative strategic trajectories seemed to shape the discourse on US involvement in the Middle East: gradual disengagement or intensified great-power competition. By late 2025, following two years of war, a third strategic option has reemerged: American dominance.
The US Options Before the October 7 Hamas Attack
The trajectory of gradual American disengagement from the Middle East is based on three factors. First, the rise of China and the increasing economic centrality of East Asia have convinced many analysts that the US should “pivot to Asia,” namely, focus on the strategic competition with China in the Indo-Pacific, deprioritizing its involvement in the Middle East (and also in Europe).
Second, a revolution in oil and gas technology, the “fracturing” of shale deposits, enabled the US to become energy independent which diminished the strategic necessity of securing Middle Eastern oil flows. While oil flows remained crucial to global markets and for US allies in Europe and East Asia, the US itself became less economically vulnerable to disruptions in the region.
A third factor which reinforced the call for disengagement was the American public perception of the Middle Eastern “forever wars.” It started in the 1990-91 first Gulf War but escalated dramatically following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 with the extended interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a brief, but also failed, intervention in 2011 in Libya. These interventions, initially framed as wars to eliminate terrorism and promote democracy, ultimately resulted in protracted civil wars, rising terrorism and regional instability.
These factors raised fundamental questions about the sustainability and desirability of prolonged US engagement in the Middle East, especially amid rising domestic fatigue with overseas commitments.
Yet, closer to the October 7 attack, a competing narrative emerged: the reassertion of great-power competition in the Middle East. There was a growing global rivalry between an authoritarian-revisionist axis (China-Russia-North Korea-Iran) and the West. This rivalry culminated in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, supported in different ways by the other members of the axis. In the Middle East context, Iran’s provided drones and other military equipment to Russia. China was deepening its ties with Iran, including major purchases of Iranian oil and the Chinese presiding over the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The March 2023 agreement between Riyadh and Tehran, brokered by China, marked a symbolic challenge to US dominance and showcased China’s role as an emerging power broker in the region
In reaction to this anti-Western penetration to the Middle East, under the context of the rising global rivalry, the US focused on several strategies. One was to promote a trade corridor – the India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC) – intended to rival China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The corridor, unveiled at the G20 Summit in 2023, aimed to connect India, the Gulf states, Israel and Europe through a network of railways, ports, and digital infrastructure. It was designed not only as an economic alternative, but also as a geopolitical instrument to bind together US allies across three regions in a counterweight to Beijing’s infrastructural hegemony.
Another US strategy was to tighten US relations with Saudi Arabia, and thus to prevent its drift toward the Sino-Russian axis. The Saudis, for their part, demanded, in return, to get an alliance with the US for protection against Iran; assistance in the construction of a civilian nuclear reactor and access to advanced American weaponry. In exchange, the US pressed the Saudis to advance normalization of relations with Israel, a move that aligned with both Israeli and American interests in fostering regional integration. For the US., normalization was also a critical component In rallying bipartisan congressional support for any formal alliance with the Saudis, especially in light of the American political establishment’s traditional pro-Israel consensus (at least before the Gaza War).
The Saudi demand from Israel with regard to the Palestinian issue at that juncture was quite minimal, restricted to symbolic gestures or rhetorical commitments to future progress.
Indeed, on the eve of Oct. 7 it looked like the Saudi-Israel normalization was unstoppable and the Middle East on the verge of a major transformation.
A Third US Option After the October 7 Hamas Attack
The Hamas-led attack on October 7 marked a dramatic rupture in the trajectory toward Saudi–Israeli normalization and served as a strategic windfall for the anti-American axis in the region. By reigniting the centrality of the Palestinian issue and provoking a sharp Israeli military response, the attack seemingly undermined US-mediated efforts to reshape the regional order and challenged the perception of American diplomatic ascendancy.
Paradoxically, the aftermath of the October 7 attack did not weaken American influence in the Middle East but instead amplified US hegemony. The United States emerged as the indispensable actor in managing both the humanitarian and political dimensions of the conflict, providing critical military, financial, and diplomatic backing to Israel. Under President Biden, Washington positioned itself as the only viable broker for ceasefire negotiations and hostage-release agreements. However, Israel’s ability to resist or delay American pressure was partly sustained by the strong backing it continued to receive from the Republican Party, limiting the leverage of a Democratic administration.
The return of President Trump to office significantly narrowed Israel’s diplomatic manoeuvrability, as the Israeli government found it more difficult to counter American demands. Trump’s approach, rooted in a more assertive foreign policy style, enabled him to extract concrete concessions from both Israel and Hamas. He successfully negotiated a hostage release agreement and a partial end to hostilities, relying not only on direct pressure on Israel but also by leveraging the influence of Hamas-aligned regional actors such as Turkey and Qatar.
In parallel, Trump promoted an ambitious peace plan. While it is unclear at this stage whether the plan will be fully implemented, at least the first stage was already carried out with the release of the hostages (as of mid-December 2025, the body of one dead Israeli hostage has yet to be returned). At the same time, Israel carried out a partial withdrawal in Gaza, though it still controls about half of the Strip. The cessation of major hostilities after two years of intense warfare, along with the successful hostage negotiations are already major accomplishments and a reaffirmation of US centrality in the region.
American dominance was also demonstrated in the domain of an inter-state war. In the Twelve-day Israel-Iran war, the US intervened militarily with a brief but massive bombing of the Iranian nuclear program, signaling a clear message: Washington remains willing to act decisively to contain Iran’s nuclear program. America’s great-power adversaries, and the allies of Iran — China and Russia — didn’t intervene. The American dominance culminated with President Trump coercing Israel to cease hostilities including recalling aircraft already en route to Iranian targets.
More generally, the US demonstrated its Middle East regional “Integrated Air and Missile Defense.” This integration enabled Arab air defense assistance to Israel, coordinated through the US Central COmmand, during Iranian missile launches against Israel in 2024 and 2025.
The US has also positioned itself as the principal external actor driving stabilization efforts in Lebanon and Syria. While many of these initiatives remain in early stages, they underscore Washington’s multidimensional engagement in a region long plagued by state fragility and sectarian fragmentation. In Lebanon the US orchestrated the construction of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and the Iranian-supported Shi’ite terrorist group Hizbullah.
In Syria the US endorsed the regime of Ahmad al-Shara’a, who has kept Iran and its proxy forces out of the country. There are still many unresolved problems in both Lebanon and Syria, but the US is working closely with both fragile regimes.
Collectively, these actions reflect a strategic shift in US policy toward a much greater focus on conflict resolution and state reconstruction, albeit within the framework of maintaining strategic dominance and countering Iranian influence.
The Sources of Current American Dominance
First and foremost is the deep dependence of Israel, the region’s most powerful military actor, on the United States. This dependency grants Washington unparalleled leverage over Israeli decision-making in times of both war and diplomacy. Echoing Henry Kissinger’s strategy in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, President Trump capitalized on Israel’s battlefield achievements to initiate a diplomatic process, leveraging military success to extract political concessions. At the same time, when Israel overreached by attacking Qatar, an American strategic partner and host to key U.S. military infrastructure, the US was able to use such a move in order to push Israel (and other Middle Eastern countries) toward the acceptance of a peace program. In Gaza, israel’s freedom of military action is now considerably constrained by the Americans,
A second source of American strength is its ability to assemble a broad Arab-Muslim coalition for promotion of the Trump peace plan for postwar Gaza. Interestingly, this coalition spans ideological and geopolitical divides: on one side it includes the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Turkey and Qatar and on the other, the main opponents of political Islam of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. What binds these disparate actors together is their shared strategic interest in cultivating favorable relations with the US. Each state seeks critical benefits especially in the area of national security such as a security umbrella (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE) and access to advanced US weaponry (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE) or a civilian nuclear reactor (Saudis and potentially the UAE).
Fundamental questions remain, as always in the Middle East. The Trump administration is preparing for the second stage of its postwar Gaza plan. Normalizing Israeli-Saudi relations seems frozen on the issue of Israeli-Palestinian steps. Following the Gaza War, the Saudis are unlikely to agree to normalization in the absence of some tangible progress on the issue of Palestinian statehood. It remains true that only the US possesses the necessary leverage to promote normalization by exerting pressures on both the Saudis and Israelis.
In short, intense American diplomatic engagement — rather than disengagement — in the Middle East seems likely, given the opportunities to advance regional peace. And given the current asymmetry of power – with the US maintaining clear dominance over both allies and rivals – traditional great-power constraints are now weaker than before the wars that began on October 7, 2023, allowing the US to act with relative freedom as a regional architect.
The United States remains the sole actor with both the capacity and credibility to navigate the many challenges in the Middle East. Its unique combination of military dominance, political leverage over key stakeholders (Israel, Arab states, and even Turkey), and assertive leadership of President Trump enables it to function as the indispensable architect of any viable post-war regional order. Without sustained American engagement, the US peace framework, supported in whole or in part by its regional allies, risks devolving into a symbolic initiative devoid of enforcement or legitimacy.
