On the morning of January 3, the world woke up to the successful US operation to seize Nicolás Maduro, head of the regime ruling Venezuela. No one should mourn his departure. But it remains uncertain whether the US move will trigger regime change and a democratic transition or alternatively a deal with regime successors.
Latin America’s great contribution to global popular culture is the telenovela — a television serial full of plot twists and turns, bitter quarrels, unexpected reconciliations, passion and violence. One thing we can be sure of is that Telenovela Venezuela has more episodes ahead.
Whether one approves or not of President Trump’s decision, no tears need be shed for Maduro. He and his predecessor, the charismatic Hugo Chávez, did a remarkable job of wrecking their country. In the name of “twenty-first century socialism” they managed to do tremendous damage to an economy of vast potential, including the world’s largest proven oil resources. They suppressed the political opposition, eliminated press freedom, supported totalitarian regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua and in the process caused massive refugee outflows.
The Trump administration adds that Maduro was the head of a narcotics cartel. What is undeniable is that his regime was complicit in international narcotics trafficking.
In recent years, as Maduro’s failures mounted and the Venezuelan people decisively turned against him, he ignored multiple off-ramps. In July 2024, he tore up the results of an election which the United States had pressed him to hold in exchange for easing US sanctions.
The true winner of the 2024 election, Edmundo González, was forced into exile, while the driving force behind Venezuela’s democratic opposition, Maria Corina Machado, lives underground in Venezuela, although she did manage to make it to Norway to receive the Nobel Peace Prize.
From Pressure Tactics to Military Action
A kinetic military option seems in hindsight – but only in hindsight – to have been almost inevitable. The President had assembled an enormous fleet in the Caribbean, as much as fifteen percent of the deployed US Navy, together with a Marine Expeditionary Unit and air assets positioned in Puerto Rico.
Since September 2025, the fleet had been blowing up launches in the Caribbean (and occasionally in the Pacific) said to be carrying drugs. This commitment to combating narcoterrorism, however, did little to lead to Maduro’s ouster.
The United States recently upped the ante with a drone attack on Venezuelan territory aimed at a facility for loading narcotics. And in a move of further escalation, the US had ordered a “complete and total blockade” of sanctioned oil tankers coming to and leaving from Venezuela, and in fact seized two ships.
Trump chose to move directly against Maduro rather than wait for the tightening blockade to eventually impact regime stability. Blockades can take time to work and (as we saw in 1990s Iraq) will certainly hurt the entire country. But was the proximate cause of January 3 operation a sudden opportunity that presented itself? We don’t know.
While Maduro is gone, the rest of the regime is intact, at least for the moment, with figures such as Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, Defense Minister General Vladimir Padrino, and Executive Vice President Delcy Rodriguez (Maduro’s successor under the regime’s constitution) all making public statements.
A Possible Transition
What happens next? President Trump on January 3 was clear that further use of force was available if needed. And indeed, the various potential successors to Maduro know that they too could be seized and brought to trial in the United States. US airpower was deployed against Venezuelan military bases simultaneously with Maduro’s seizure and could be deployed again. The continuing blockade of oil tankers, if not negotiated away quickly, could eventually lead to a revolt by unpaid soldiers.
Thus, the United States, should it engage in adroit diplomacy backed by the threat of renewed force, could create the conditions for a genuine democratic transition, perhaps leaving regime insiders with the chance to ultimately leave the country with their ill-gotten gains intact. A deal would have to be worked out with the armed forces, which have long been corrupted and compromised, but may be prepared to give up the power they have enjoyed and return to the barracks under the right circumstances. Any transition would have to address Venezuela’s police, prosecutors and judges who have all become tools of oppression.
A Likely Deal Involving Oil
Any transition would have to deal with Venezuela’s acute economic crisis. Assuring the flow of foreign exchange to support food purchases for the population would have to be a top priority; the United States would have to lead an effort with the international financial institutions and other countries to provide short and medium-term aid. And rebuilding Venezuela’s battered oil sector, the key to longer-term economic stability, would be a multi-year challenge.
Trump mentioned oil throughout his January 3 press conference, but made no reference to its role in rebuilding Venezuela’s economy. Indeed, the likeliest possibility would be that Trump opts to do business with his successors perhaps in exchange for commitments to aggressively combat drug trafficking and enter into a dialogue with the opposition. (Such dialogues have been conducted by the regime in the past.) At the same time, they could then renew Maduro’s offer, made before his seizure, to give US companies preferential access to Venezuela’s oil. Such an outcome is by no means inconceivable.
Knock-On Effects in the Region
Immediate reactions in Latin America split on predictable ideological lines. Argentina’s Javier Milei cheered that “Freedom advances” (which happens to be the name of his own political party). Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino has called for an “orderly and legitimate transition process.” By contrast, Brazilian President Lula da Silva asserted that the United States had crossed an “unacceptable line,” Colombia President Gustavo Petro has termed it an “assault on Venezuelan and Latin American sovereignty,” and Mexican President Sheinbaum has called it a “clear violation” of international law.
The Cuban regime has close ties to Maduro’s regime and has long provided personal security details to protect both him and Chávez. Venezuela in the past supplied oil to Cuba at subsidized rates, although its own economic crisis has greatly limited its ability to continue doing so. In exchange, Cuban intelligence shared information with the regime on Venezuelan opposition figures. The implications for those governing Cuba (and Nicaragua) of regime change in Venezuela, should it come to pass, would hardly be welcome.
The move against Maduro has definitely shaken up the region. It will also negatively affect Maduro allies Russia, China, Turkey, Iran and Lebanese Hizbullah. The next plot twist could be as unexpected as the January 3 episode.
