Washington cannot demand enduring strategic alignment while making its own commitments appear conditional on domestic politics.
Steve Bannon recently questioned why the United States should protect Gulf states and their energy assets. Brett McGurk, who served under National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan in the Biden White House, has acknowledged that the controversy over President Biden’s 2022 meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman set back American diplomacy.
The two episodes reflect different political arguments, not a common doctrine. But they expose the same strategic risk: Washington sometimes questions the value of its partners at home, then expects them to support American priorities abroad. That expectation deserves scrutiny, especially as the United States competes with China for investment, technology and influence.
This is not an argument for shielding Gulf governments from criticism. It is an argument for distinguishing principled disagreement from political inconsistency that diminishes American leverage.
Bannon’s premise is that American oil abundance reduces the need to secure the Gulf. In 2025, the region accounted for just 8 percent of U.S. crude oil imports. But oil trades in a global market. The U.S. Energy Information Administration reports that flows through the Strait of Hormuz fell from 21.6 million barrels a day in late 2025 to 5.1 million in the second quarter of 2026, recovering only partly in the third. Brent crude averaged $124 a barrel in October.
American energy production does not protect American consumers or allies from worldwide disruption. Nor does Gulf security concern oil alone. It encompasses shipping routes, military access, intelligence cooperation, finance and the regional balance of power. The Carter Doctrine established in 1980 that preventing hostile domination of the Persian Gulf was an American strategic interest, not a charitable obligation to particular rulers. That interest can be reassessed without being dismissed.
The Biden-era episode illustrates a different problem. Biden was entitled to confront the Saudi government over the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. But after campaigning to make Saudi Arabia a pariah, he visited in July 2022 to pursue American interests. McGurk later described the greeting controversy as a diplomatic setback even while calling the visit productive. Human rights standards and diplomatic engagement are not mutually exclusive. The real test is whether Washington can pursue both without allowing symbolism to overwhelm strategy.
Iran demonstrates why partners will not automatically adopt every American decision. Gulf governments share concerns about Tehran’s weapons and regional networks. But in 2026, Iranian strikes on Gulf infrastructure made unmistakable the different costs of escalation. Gulf cities, ports, airports and energy installations are exposed to retaliation. Washington may conclude that force is necessary; its partners may favor deterrence combined with mediation. Neither position settles every question of policy, and the Gulf states themselves disagree. Their proximity gives them reasons to calculate risk differently.
American diplomacy should not mistake that calculation for disloyalty. A regional partner capable of opening channels to Iran, restraining escalation or protecting maritime traffic can advance U.S. interests even when it declines to endorse a particular military course.
Ukraine is a different test. All six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council voted for the March 2022 United Nations resolution demanding Russian withdrawal. But supporting Ukrainian sovereignty did not require them to adopt the entire Western sanctions regime or sever contact with Moscow. Those channels have sometimes served tangible diplomatic purposes. In April 2026, the United States and the United Arab Emirates helped facilitate a Russia-Ukraine exchange involving 193 prisoners from each side.
Washington may reasonably object to specific dealings that undermine sanctions or assist Russian aggression. But it should also recognize the value of diplomacy by countries that retain access to both sides. An alignment of interests is not a transfer of sovereignty.
The economic contradiction is equally consequential. The White House has announced Gulf-related investment and commercial commitments measured in trillions of dollars, although many are prospective pledges rather than completed investments. Washington welcomes their promise for American jobs, industry and infrastructure. Yet parts of American political debate treat Gulf-linked finance as presumptively suspect.
Congress should investigate bribery, conflicts of interest and illicit foreign influence. It should scrutinize sensitive investment and enforce American law. But an investment is not itself a bribe, and a political allegation is not a judicial finding. Sweeping insinuations weaken the distinction America’s institutions are supposed to uphold between lawful commerce and misconduct.
Meanwhile Washington asks Gulf partners to restrict sensitive technology and economic links with China. Those demands can be justified by national-security risks. The contradiction emerges when the United States invites partners to make long-term commitments to the American economy while leaving them uncertain whether those relationships will retain political legitimacy after the next election.
China offers markets, capital and technology; Russia preserves diplomatic and economic channels; Europe, while allied with the United States, competes for the same commercial opportunities. They are not equivalent strategic alternatives. None must replace America’s security role to benefit from greater hedging. If partners diversify their investments, reduce dependence on U.S. technology and become less willing to support American initiatives, Washington loses options without any formal alliance collapsing.
Gulf governments also have obligations. They must respect agreements, protect sensitive technology, prevent illicit finance and accept that America will sometimes disagree with them. American security guarantees must be evaluated, not presumed unlimited.
But Washington needs a consistent framework: clearly defined commitments, reciprocal burden-sharing, transparent investment screening, evidence-based accountability and sustained diplomacy across administrations. It should distinguish activities that threaten U.S. security from ordinary commercial diversification, and disagreement over tactics from opposition to American interests.
The United States retains extraordinary military and economic power. Its strategic influence, however, depends on other governments choosing to coordinate their futures with it. Repeated political reversals can make that choice less attractive—and the exercise of American power more costly.
America’s competitors do not have to defeat it to diminish its influence. They need only persuade its partners that dependence on Washington has become a risk to be managed.
The greatest danger to American leadership is not that its partners have alternatives. It is that Washington may give them increasing reasons to exercise those alternatives.
