Political Islam’s Pursuit of Power: Cooperation with the Left as a Means of Control, Not Permanent Power-Sharing
The political landscape of the Western left is undergoing a structural mutation. The familiar label “Marxist-Islamist” no longer adequately describes the relationship developing between progressive activism and political Islam. The label carried an assumption: that Marxism was the senior partner, using religion for its own revolution. Iran disproved that assumption in 1979. What is emerging in the West is an alignment in which that asymmetry is the starting condition rather than the eventual surprise. It is Islamo-leftist: political Islam leads, and the left’s language, networks, and institutions serve it. The term is used here not as the polemical label of French debates, but to name that specific structure. The alignment requires neither a shared economic doctrine nor agreement about the society its participants ultimately wish to build. It operates through common adversaries, moral language, electoral cooperation, and institutional access.
Parts of the secular left increasingly supply the intellectual justification and institutional protection through which political Islam can advance. Both sides gain immediate advantages, but their long-term purposes can remain fundamentally incompatible. A movement does not need to announce its entire political destination to benefit from an alliance. It needs partners willing to legitimize its presence, defend it against criticism, and postpone disagreements about the authority it ultimately seeks.
The Iranian Precedent
Iran provides a historical warning about this mechanism. The Shah’s Iran was a rapidly modernizing country undergoing extensive economic, educational, and social transformation. Women’s public participation, expanding universities, industrial development, and changing urban life formed part of the society the revolutionary coalition confronted. The question is how Khomeini acquired emancipatory legitimacy among people whose own political aspirations were incompatible with clerical rule.
Opposition to the Shah brought together religious organizations, Marxists, nationalists, liberals, and intellectuals who disagreed about the future. For some, Khomeini represented religious government. For others, he became a symbol of national independence, social justice, or resistance to American influence. His authority accumulated meanings that different constituencies could interpret according to their own hopes.
The Shah named this coalition long before it triumphed. As early as 1965, he told Time that his opponents formed an unholy alliance of “black reactionaries” and “destructive Reds.” He returned to the theme in exile: in his final book, Answer to History, he called it the “Unholy Alliance of Red and Black.” That alliance brought down the monarchy, and the clerics who led it then dismantled the left that had entered it.
The Tudeh Party’s relationship with Khomeini illustrates the calculation: a religious leader could receive revolutionary endorsement because he confronted an adversary the left also opposed. As Mansour Farhang recounts, the Tudeh welcomed the seizure of the American embassy as a blow to American imperialism and worked to prolong the crisis, while, as Encyclopaedia Iranica records, Khomeini’s camp used the crisis to defeat its liberal and secular leftist rivals and to ratify a constitution legitimizing the new regime.
The trap was the substitution of shared opposition for agreement about sovereignty. Who would govern after victory? Would women, dissenters, and political opponents retain rights independent of the movement claiming to embody the revolution? Those questions were subordinated to the immediate struggle, and criticism of the leadership could be made to appear as weakening the revolution itself. The Western setting differs institutionally, but the same error can recur whenever confrontation with a common enemy becomes sufficient reason to suspend scrutiny of a partner’s objectives.
Islamophobia and the Intellectual Shield
Opposition to prejudice against Muslims is a legitimate democratic responsibility. The political shift occurs when protection of people is extended into protection of political Islam. Criticism of an Islamist organization then becomes hostility toward Muslims. Opposition to religious coercion becomes cultural intolerance. Questions about Sharia, women’s equality, or freedom of expression become evidence against the questioner’s motives.
Parts of the left reinforce this protection through sociological and political explanations: discrimination, exclusion, colonial history, Western intervention. Such explanations can illuminate the conditions in which movements develop. They become instruments of protection when they repeatedly displace responsibility for what those movements advocate. No central doctrine is required. The protection emerges through recurring habits of argument: the oppressed possess presumptive moral authority; opposition to Western power confers authenticity; criticism risks assisting the enemy; internal dissent threatens solidarity.
Foreign funding shapes the environment in which these arguments develop. Qatar has financed university partnerships, research centers, and cultural initiatives in Western countries, and a report by the Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy traces Qatar Foundation International’s programs across American schools, universities, and teacher training. The question is not whether such funding automatically determines political outcomes, but whether universities, NGOs, and media organizations become dependent on donors whose interests conflict with academic freedom and democratic transparency.
What separates political Islam from religious conservatism within Western democracies is its destination: the latter contends for influence inside a secular constitutional order, while political Islam seeks religious authority as public authority. The decisive boundary is crossed when a person’s right to challenge religious authority becomes conditional on the political convenience of the coalition defending it.
That boundary is often crossed among the young. Housing costs, debt, insecure employment, and distrust of institutions create a demand for politics that promises more than administrative adjustment. Radicalism offers clarity, friendship, and identity, and can function as a secular faith, while social media merges a civilian population, an armed movement, and a religious regime into one symbol of resistance. The Palestinian cause is especially consequential here. Its moral force can be appropriated to shelter antisemitism, the glorification of armed violence, and apologetics for Hamas, Hezbollah, or the Islamic Republic. The young activist may believe that solidarity strengthens the vulnerable. What matters is which organized forces acquire legitimacy through that solidarity and what they intend to do with it.
From Electoral Partnership to Religious Authority
The alliance functions through an exchange of political resources. Progressive institutions provide language, platforms, professional networks, and access to party structures. Religious-political organizations can provide volunteers, fundraising relationships, neighborhood connections, and concentrated electoral support.
The balance changes when electoral usefulness becomes authority inside the coalition. A partner capable of delivering support can influence candidate selection, policy priorities, public statements, and the boundaries of acceptable criticism. Dependence then works in one direction. Leaders avoid disputes they consider electorally costly. Institutions accept organized community representatives as authoritative interlocutors, and those representatives become the channel through which a community is consulted, funded, and counted. Internal dissenters become inconvenient because their testimony complicates the alliance’s preferred account of minority solidarity. Where institutions accept community gatekeepers as representatives of people who cannot contest their authority, women, secular Muslims, and religious dissenters face a double obstacle: pressure within their communities and political reluctance outside them to challenge an influential ally.
This is how cooperation becomes control. No takeover is required, only the accumulated reluctance of partners to confront the gatekeepers on whom their majorities depend. At that stage, the secular left may begin serving objectives it does not openly endorse. Political Islam does not seek to be the left’s electorate; it seeks to direct it.
The public visibility of figures such as Zohran Mamdani, Sadiq Khan, and Abdul El-Sayed belongs within this changing landscape. Mamdani occupies New York’s mayoralty, Khan leads London, and El-Sayed, by defeating Mike Rogers in Michigan, will take his seat as the first Muslim elected to the United States Senate. Their political records and coalitions differ, and their election demonstrates political success, not Islamist leverage. They are named here because their success marks the point at which the question of institutional access stops being theoretical: in New York and London it is already a matter of governing practice, and in the Senate it soon will be.
An acceptable public face can make associated networks easier to receive, consult, and defend. Campaign finance records capture only part of that environment; a modern campaign also runs on volunteers, community organizations, institutional relationships, and mobilization networks that never appear in a budget or a donor list. This is the Trojan-horse danger: illiberal objectives passing through an inclusive political presentation. Mamdani’s establishment of a Mayor’s Office of LGBTQIA+ Affairs sets a commitment within his administration. The question is whether the organizations gaining access around progressive leadership accept the same freedoms, including the freedom to challenge religious authority, and whether leaders confront them when they do not.
Open demands for Sharia make the issue direct. Where an organization explicitly calls for religious law, its stated objective should be examined on its merits: what authority would religious rules possess, who would enforce them, and could individuals refuse them without penalty? Responsibility belongs to those advancing such demands, not to every Muslim. Britain shows why formal jurisdiction and practical authority must be considered together. Sharia councils have no binding authority under civil law, yet the independent review commissioned by the Home Office identified discriminatory practices and pressure on some women seeking religious divorces. Political accommodation becomes dangerous when it strengthens such obstacles or treats community leadership as a substitute for individual consent.
The alliance also faces electoral limits. Concentrated organization can influence primaries and urban constituencies without defining an entire national electorate. In the 2026 midterms Democrats won both chambers, and Jon Ossoff and James Talarico won alongside El-Sayed. A Jewish senator from Georgia and a Christian progressive from Texas represent the Western civilizational and religious identity that the alliance treats as an obstacle, and their election in the same wave shows that this identity remains alive inside the same governing coalition. Yet for political Islam, institutional entry is valuable even without national dominance: influence over a party’s vocabulary, coalition relationships, or willingness to confront religious coercion produces durable advantages. For the left, the danger is the gradual surrender of its own standards when a coalition grants religious-political actors exemptions from the scrutiny applied to everyone else.
The LGBT contradiction exposes the alliance’s unresolved hierarchy of values. Some queer activists extend solidarity to movements whose religious commitments deny the freedoms on which their own public lives depend. The same logic silences women, secular Muslims, converts, and religious dissenters. Here solidarity becomes a mechanism of exclusion: the person challenging religious authority is treated as a threat to the alliance, while the institution exercising that authority receives protection.
None of this means that the Iranian pattern has already been repeated in the West, or that every Muslim politician or progressive institution is part of a single Islamist project. A new strategy is emerging: cooperation with parts of the Western left as a means of gaining ideological protection, institutional access, electoral leverage, and eventual control over the terms of public authority. Whether that strategy matures into the kind of power seen in Iran is a question history will answer.
Iran demonstrated how a shared struggle could obscure incompatible destinations. Western institutions face different circumstances, but they must still answer the question that coalition enthusiasm tends to postpone: who will possess authority, and what rights will remain beyond that authority’s reach?
The answer will be visible in the freedom to dissent: the woman resisting religious pressure, the Muslim rejecting an organization’s claim to represent him, the LGBT activist confronting a partner’s intolerance, and the citizen criticizing Islamism without being accused of hatred toward Muslims.
When those freedoms become negotiable, political Islam has gained more than an ally. It has gained influence over the terms on which its own power may be challenged.
